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Directorate of  
Intelligence

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# Terrorism Review ( [REDACTED] )

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3 May 1990

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Approved for Release

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3 May 1990

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Terrorism Review

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## Terrorism Review

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### Focus

#### Lebanon: The Release of Robert Polhill

On 22 April Robert Polhill, one of four Beirut University College professors kidnapped on 24 January 1987, was released by the Hizballah faction Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine (IJLP). Polhill was turned over to Syrian Brig. Gen. Ghazi Khanan in front of the Summerland Hotel in West Beirut and was driven to Damascus to be turned over to the US Ambassador. After medical evaluations and debriefings, Polhill returned to the United States on 26 April. His release was undoubtedly the result of Iranian and Syrian pressure on the hostage holders over the past several months. In the aftermath of Polhill's release, speculation continues that additional hostages will be freed in the near term.

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#### Hizballah's Role

Hizballah factions are apparently subject in varying degrees to Iranian influence. We believe the IJLP—a faction within Hizballah that still holds US hostages Jesse Turner and Alann Steen—and the Revolutionary Justice Organization—the faction that probably controls Joseph Cicippio and Edward Tracy—are heavily influenced by Iran. Both factions appear to be more susceptible to Iranian pressure—especially on the hostage issue—than is the Islamic Jihad Organization, which probably controls Terry Anderson and Thomas Sutherland.

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Hizballah leaders showed that they had some control over the exact timing of the release as they yielded to external influences. One of the group's officials, Hussein Musawi, made several statements to the press indicating that a release would take place but that the timing was still being worked out. The hostage holders claimed they delayed the scheduled release for 48 hours because the United States refused to comply with the kidnappers' demand that Assistant Secretary of State John H. Kelly be sent to Damascus to complete the arrangements. It remains unclear why the kidnappers wanted Kelly; however, they apparently bowed to Iranian pressure that a hostage be released "unconditionally." Hizballah opposition may also have been encouraged to begin releasing hostages by statements made by Hizballah spiritual guide Fadlallah, supporting Rafsanjani's calls for release and condemning hostage holding for tarnishing Islam.

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#### Iran's Role

Polhill's release appears to have been the result of months of effort by Iranian President Rafsanjani to break the stalemate over the hostages. We believe Rafsanjani's latest initiative began with the February *Tehran Times* editorial calling for the "unconditional" release of the hostages. Iran's growing economic woes and its continued international isolation probably prompted Rafsanjani to push the hostage holders for a release. Within the government, hardline elements led by former Interior Minister Mohtashemi-Pur apparently slowed the process by warning against dealings with the "Great Satan." Negotiations between Iran and

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the hostage holders apparently took place between February and late April. ~~XXXXXX~~ Hashemi Bahramani, brother of Iranian President Rafsanjani, made several trips to Beirut and Damascus in March and early April, where he probably met with Hizballah leaders to discuss the hostage situation. ~~(S)~~

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#### Syria's Role

Damascus adopted a higher profile in the Polhill release than in most previous releases of Western hostages, in which it acted primarily as an intermediary between Washington and Tehran. During the past two months, Syrian officials made encouraging public statements and consulted closely with Iranian officials who had dealt with the hostage holders on the Polhill release. ~~(S)~~

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Assad's greater involvement is intended to improve Syria's relations with the West. He wants the United States and the European Community to drop economic sanctions against Syria and to provide help for the country's troubled economy. The growing uncertainty in Soviet-Syrian relations is contributing to the urgency in Damascus of improving ties to the West. Assad may calculate that Syrian cooperation on the hostage issue will erode the Western view of Syria as a state supporter of terrorism. ~~(S)~~

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Assad appears willing to help in securing the release of the remaining Western hostages. He probably believes the United States is interested in forging better ties, given Washington's criticism of Israel's policies in the occupied territories and recent visits to Damascus by a high-level Congressional delegation and former senior US officials. Nevertheless, Assad almost certainly is sympathetic to the apparent interests of Tehran and its Lebanese allies to link the release of Western

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hostages to that of Lebanese Shi'a and Palestinian captives in Lebanon, Israel, Kuwait, and Western Europe. He will probably cooperate with the United States only if Washington tries to accommodate Syria's interests and those of its Iranian and Lebanese allies. (S) b (3)

#### Outlook

Even as rumors of additional hostage releases surface, Hizballah continues its criticism of the United States. On 24 April—two days after Polhill's release—Hizballah official Hussein Musawi accused the United States of responding to the release with ill will and urged pro-Iranian Shi'a militants to continue holding their captives. As the number of remaining hostages decreases, Hizballah is likely to emphasize its demand for the release of prisoners in Israel, Kuwait, and Western Europe. (S) b (3)

Iranian officials will continue to stress the need for reciprocal gestures by Washington. Rafsanjani's efforts on the hostages are drawing criticism from his hardline opponents, who are apparently concerned that hostage releases are the inevitable prelude to direct contacts with Washington. Mohtashemi-Pur recently described the United States as "a ferocious animal that can only harm the interests of Iran" and warned that a boycott was necessary to safeguard revolutionary purity. Assembly Speaker Karrubi has also warned of the dangers of contacts with the United States. (S NF)

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## Highlights **b3**

### Significant Developments

#### Latin America

##### Peru

###### Sendero Luminoso, Postelection Violence

Peru's Sendero Luminoso (SL) insurgents have intensified their campaign of election year terrorism, taking advantage of relaxed security following the latest round of elections on 8 April. [REDACTED] since that date, SL has assassinated several Peruvian Government officials, including mayors and other local officers, and a former social security director—the most senior official yet killed by SL. SL has also attacked bridges, powerlines, and government buildings, and [REDACTED] destroyed a police truck. While much of the current violence is linked to SL's effort to disrupt the election process, some incidents are in retaliation against communities that support antiguerrilla activities. In one recent case in Junin Department, SL [REDACTED] massacred 60 villagers, including women and children. SL will probably continue the current campaign of terror at least through the runoff election on 3 June [REDACTED] **b3**

#### South/East Asia

##### India

###### Violence in Kashmir

Violence in Kashmir has been escalating. On 6 April, the student wing of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front kidnapped the vice chancellor of Kashmiri University, his secretary, and an official of the state-run Hindustan Machine Tools. Several days later the three were murdered after the government refused to swap three jailed militants for them. [REDACTED] a previously unknown militant group, the Mujahedeen Kashmir, claimed responsibility for the 10 April bombings of two police stations in New Delhi, which wounded nine officers, and for the 12 April bombing of a passenger train in Bombay, which injured 30 people. These were the first attacks outside Kashmir since the militants began their campaign last year. The level of violence almost certainly will increase because Kashmir Governor Jagmohan has ordered police and Army forces in Kashmir to adopt harsher measures to combat the militants. [REDACTED] **b3**

###### Direct Rule Extended in Punjab

In early April, New Delhi extended direct rule of Punjab for another six months. Punjab has been ruled directly by the federal government since May 1987, when a moderate Sikh administration was dismissed and the state legislature dissolved by New Delhi amid increasing separatist violence. This latest extension is likely to bolster Sikh militants. [REDACTED] **b3**

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#### Violence in Assam

Extremism is on the rise in Assam. On 13 April, at least 20 people were killed and as many as 100 injured when two passenger trains were derailed by bombs set by Bodo militants. [REDACTED] Bodo tribesmen, who want a separate Bodo state, have carried out attacks against public facilities and security personnel for the last three years. [REDACTED] the United Liberation Front of Assam, an insurgent group pledged to liberate Assam through armed revolution, has increased its activities in recent months. The group [REDACTED] was responsible for the kidnapping on 4 April of the brother-in-law of Assam's chief minister and for the slaying of a prominent businessman. (S)

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
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
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## Terrorism in Asia in the 1990s: Trends and Prospects

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Several Asian countries, particularly the Philippines, India, and Pakistan, will continue to face chronic, largely domestic, terrorist threats in the 1990s. Over the short term, the Philippine Government will face the greatest challenge as Communist insurgents increasingly resort to terrorism. The assassination of US diplomatic and military personnel will be a key element of the insurgents' strategy. We believe that communalism will remain the driving force for most terrorist groups on the Indian subcontinent. Although North Korea has not directly carried out a terrorist act since 1987, P'yongyang remains a threat to South Korea and might resort to terrorism if convinced that such attacks would destabilize the South Korean Government. Even if P'yongyang does not carry out attacks, it will remain a patron of revolutionary groups, some of which carry out acts of terrorism. Iran and Libya will probably view Asia as an attractive site for terrorism and for bases of operations.

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### Philippines

The Communist threat to the Aquino government and to US interests in the Philippines will remain high for several years. If the Communists continue to suffer military setbacks, we believe they will resort increasingly to terrorist attacks in an effort to undermine the government. The Communist New People's Army (NPA) has assassinated eight Americans since 1987, and its resolve to attack US personnel and facilities is unlikely to diminish, even if the Philippine Government makes significant inroads against them. A militarily weaker NPA may pose an even greater risk to Americans because the insurgents would blame their setbacks on US support to the Aquino administration. Although senior US diplomats and military officers are likely to remain the NPA's primary targets, the insurgents will not hesitate to kill lower ranking US personnel and may resort to attacks on American businesses.

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### Asian Terrorists: In Search of Justifications

The international collapse of Marxism probably will force some leftist terrorist groups to find new ways to attract new supporters. We believe that the standard leftist jargon—such as calls for class struggle—will have little, if any, appeal to Asian youths and even fail to motivate some members of radical organizations. Nationalism may become a driving force for many groups. We suspect that, in the wake of Marxism's rapid decline, the NPA will attempt to rally support by stressing its nationalist credentials and downplaying—at least to the public—its revolutionary doctrine. Extreme leftist groups may try to attract new supporters by emphasizing their nationalist credentials. We suspect some groups in Asia will try to exploit the growing interest in environmentalism and claim the issue as their own. Chukaku-ha, for example, is trying to play a greater role in the antinuclear campaign. Organizations that do not adapt to the changing ideological climate probably will retain only a small core of fanatical supporters.

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US personnel also are threatened by rightwing military dissidents, particularly over the short term.

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If they launch a coup, we believe some of these dissidents would threaten US personnel. Other soldiers, while not dissidents, may not be willing to provide adequate security support to US facilities or may be slow to respond to requests for assistance.

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The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) is likely to pose only a small threat to Americans. The MNLF, a Muslim separatist group, has kidnapped Americans and other foreigners for ransom from time to time. All of these abductions have occurred in Mindanao, however, and most Americans have been released quickly; other foreign nationals have been held for several months. Although the MNLF has received Libyan and Iranian support, there is no evidence that the group will attack Americans in return for the aid. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] We expect that Punjabi radicals will continue their campaign of intimidation and violence until the central government, at a minimum, satisfies their demands for significantly greater self-rule. [REDACTED]

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Sikh violence probably will not significantly spill into other parts of India. [REDACTED] all Sikh organizations focus their operations in Punjab. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] are likely to continue to focus on fundraising for their parent bodies. [REDACTED]

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Kashmir will remain wracked by violence. Militant separatists—led by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front—will continue to carry out bombings and assassinations in a bid to win independence for their state. [REDACTED] the separatists have the tacit support of the majority of Kashmiris, complicating government efforts to resolve the problem. Over the short term, we believe that the Indian Government will try to restore order through the massive deployment of security forces. [REDACTED]

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Radical Middle Eastern groups may view the Philippines as a venue for terrorism or as an operational support base. [REDACTED]

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#### India

Communal violence will grip India throughout the 1990s, and many militant groups will probably resort to terrorist tactics. Although few, if any, of these groups will target Americans, US citizens will be at risk incidentally, particularly in attacks against the Indian transportation system. [REDACTED]

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
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
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#### Airport Security Woes

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
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There have been some improvements in Asia, however. Over the past few years the Indian Government has improved airport security, ~~and~~ the airports in New Delhi and Bombay are no longer soft targets.

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Airport security in the Philippines also has improved significantly in recent years. ~~For example,~~ the Philippine Government high marks for upgrading physical security and inspection procedures at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport in Manila.

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
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#### Pakistan/Afghanistan

Although Afghan-sponsored terrorism in Pakistan will decline in the 1990s, violent feuding among Afghan mujahidin factions will continue to spill into the country.



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Last year, however, the number of ~~attacks~~ attacks declined significantly, probably because the bombings damaged Kabul's international image. In our view, feuding mujahidin factions are largely responsible for the spate of bombings in Peshawar this year. They probably are also responsible for some attacks against Westerners. The bombings are likely to continue because of the deep divisions within the Afghan refugee community in Peshawar and the Pakistani Government's inability to stop such bloodshed. ~~Westerners~~ Westerners—both diplomats and refugee workers—are at high risk, and some will be targeted by mujahidin who believe that the United States has betrayed their cause.

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Pro-Iranian Pakistani Shi'a, particularly the Movement for the Implementation of Shi'a Jurisprudence (TNFJ) and its student wing, the Imamia Students' Organization (ISO), will pose a threat to US personnel in Pakistan. The TNFJ is a political party composed of militant Shi'as.

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The ISO is suspected of the bombing in July 1985 of the Pan Am office in Lahore.

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At a minimum, we believe these groups will support and carry out terrorist attacks to further their own goals and those of Tehran.

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We believe that Iran and Libya will continue to view Pakistan as an attractive operational environment for terrorism.

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#### Southeast Asia

Militant groups in Southeast Asia, some of which have used terrorist tactics, will pose only modest threats:

- The Free Papua Movement (OPM) is a loose collection of rebels active in Irian Jaya and the Indonesian/Papua New Guinean border. Although the group poses no imminent threat to Westerners, we believe that US personnel will be at risk if some OPM leaders believe the United States is propping up the Suharto government. The OPM may also consider kidnapping Americans to bring attention to its cause.
- The Aceh Merdeka Movement (Free Aceh Movement) in Indonesia has been largely inactive since the late 1970s, when it attempted to extort money from US firms and assassinated a Mobil Oil employee. The group's activity increased somewhat last year, but there is no evidence it is targeting the 250

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Americans

Iran and Libya are likely to view several countries in Southeast Asia as an attractive base of operations, and both will attempt to recruit local supporters.

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**b (3) North Korea's Support for Terrorism**

North Korea has not been detected carrying out a direct act of terrorism since members [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] planted a bomb on a South Korean airliner in 1987. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] North Korea carefully plots its attacks, and long lulls between them are not unusual. [REDACTED]

terrorism, however, if it believed such attacks would destabilize the South Korean Government. As Kim Chong-il succeeds his father as head of state, North Korea's involvement in terrorism could increase, particularly if the younger Kim encounters opposition and believes he can diminish it by raising tension. In a bid to catalyze political unrest in the South, the North could target South Korean military and government leaders, US military personnel and bases, or even opposition South Korean political figures if it believes it can conceal its hand. [REDACTED]

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We believe North Korea is likely to provide training and sanctuary to revolutionary groups, some of which conduct acts of terrorism. Various Middle Eastern radical organizations that are likely to lose their bases of operations in Eastern Europe almost certainly view P'yongyang as an alternative. We believe that North Korea—which sees itself as one of the last bastions of armed revolution—is likely to welcome some of them. In addition, we expect P'yongyang to provide aid to South Korean radical groups, some of which may carry out terrorist acts. [REDACTED]

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Over the next few years several factors will determine North Korea's commitment to terrorism. Sensitive to the public relations penalties of its past operations, P'yongyang may now be less inclined to carry out attacks. North Korea is more likely to resort to

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
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## Chronology of Terrorism—1990

*Below are described selected noteworthy foreign and international events involving terrorists or the use of terrorist tactics. These events have occurred or come to light since our last issue. In some cases, the perpetrators and their motivations may not be known. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in this publication are not included.*

### Western Europe

2 April

*Northern Ireland: Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) bomb discovered outside Fort George Army Base near Londonderry. The device was control detonated after the area was evacuated.*

*Greece: Bomb explodes near residence of former Minister and New Democracy Deputy's brother in Iraklion, Crete. No group claimed responsibility.*

3 April

*Greece: Bombs explode at Ministry of National Economy, General Confederation of Greek Workers, and Federation of Greek Industries Association in Athens. The Revolutionary Popular Struggle and the 1 May Group claimed responsibility.*

4 April

*Spain: Gunmen shoot and kill Civil Guard member near his residence in Pasajes. The Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) is probably responsible.*

6 April

*Turkey: Dev Sol detonates bombs at six military and national police stations in Istanbul and seventh at business center near military hospital.*

7 April

*Spain: Terra Lliure bombs memorial statue in San Cugat, injuring two persons. The group is believed responsible for a second bomb at an office in Montserrat.*

*Spain: ETA launches six grenades at Civil Guard installation in Lekunberri, injuring four guardsmen and killing detection dog that tripped boobytrap device.*

10 April

*Turkey: Separatist terrorists kill seven family members during raid on Ortulu hamlet in Siirt Province.*

### Middle East

16 April

*Lebanon: Amal official is assassinated by gunmen in Beirut. Hizballah has denied responsibility for the attack.*

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19 April

Egypt: Three attackers on motorcycle throw bombs and direct gunfire on Coptic church in Sanhur, killing one policeman and injuring two. b3

22 April

West Bank: Shots fired at bus en route from Qiryat Arba' to Jerusalem near Bayt Immar, injuring one Israeli passenger. b3

Latin America

11 March

Chile: 150-gram bomb fails to explode at Instituto Chileno Norteamericano Binational Center in Chillan. No one has claimed responsibility. b3

29 March

Chile: Bomb destroys offices at Freedom and Development Institute for Political Studies and Public Opinion in Santiago. No one has claimed responsibility. b3

12 April

Chile: Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front terrorists detonate bomb at residence of two Justices of the Supreme Court in Santiago. b3

16 April

El Salvador: Suspected Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front members assassinate judge in La Union Department. b3

South/East Asia

5 April

Philippines: New People's Army gunmen assassinate police constabulary captain in his car. b3

12 April

Japan: Incendiary devices destroy residence of managing director of Japan Aircraft Manufacturing Company in Kamakura, injuring him and killing his wife. Chukuhā-ha claimed responsibility. b3

13 April

Pakistan: Bomb explosion under parked car at Islamabad market injures two children. No one has claimed responsibility. b3

18 April

Pakistan: Bomb [REDACTED] explodes [REDACTED] at bus station in Parachinar, capital of Kurram Agency, killing three persons and wounding 28. b1 b3  
[REDACTED]

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19 April

*India: Explosion on bus kills 13 passengers and injures 36 in Punjab.* [REDACTED]

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Africa

12 April

*Ethiopia: Small bombs explode on grounds of Sudanese Embassy and the Libyan Arab People's Bureau in Addis Ababa, causing little damage. No one has claimed responsibility.* [REDACTED]

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